O artigo trata da primeira da fase, bem mais breve, do pensamento filosófico de Lima Vaz, reconhecido como um dos principais filósofos de sua geração no Brasil. Depois de fornecer algumas indicações sobre sua formação intelectual, detém-se na sua reflexão sobre as condições de reconciliação entre a mensagem cristã e o pensamento moderno através de seus artigos sobre “consciência histórica”, visando resgatar o verdadeiro sentido da modernidade. Analisa também a aplicação feita por ele dessas ideias à solução dos graves problemas (...) da sociedade brasileira então em debate, bem como a repercussão pública de sua proposta num momento decisivo da história nacional. Discute em seguida se ele com isso se mostra então favorável a um pensamento cristão alternativo à metafísica tradicional, concluindo por uma provável negativa. (shrink)

O artigo apresenta uma visão de conjunto do pensamento de Lima Vaz, a partir de seu método original, caracterizado por seu cunho rememorativo, dialético e sistemático. Ele é aplicado particularmente na Antropologia Filosófica e na Ética, sintetizando a categoria de história com a de transcendência, superando assim a crise do pensamento moderno à luz da práxis ética.

As relações Estado-Religião têm sido regidas na modernidade pelo princípio da laicidade do Estado. Esta laicidade assumiu, muitas vezes, o caráter de negação dos valores transcendentes, sob a capa de neutralidade do Estado. Tal posição se explica pela origem do Estado laico como reação à influência dominante das Igrejas cristãs sobre toda a vida social, no período anterior à Revolução Francesa. Ora, esta contraposição entre as esferas religiosa e política perdeu qualquer sentido no mundo atual, pelo menos, no Ocidente. Com (...) efeito, as mudanças culturais advindas com a secularização da sociedade reclamam - está é a proposta do artigo - um novo modelo de laicidade, segundo o qual o Estado, longe de pretender impor aos cidadãos uma determinada visão do mundo, pretensamente científica, mas, na verdade, ideológica, promova a participação de todas as forças vivas da nação, em particular, das comunidades religiosas, no debate público sobre as questões de interesse comum, sobretudo no seu aspecto ético. Palavras-chave : Laicidade; Estado; Religião; Tradições culturais; Secularização; Ética.The relations between Religion and State have been ruled in modern times by a secularist view of politics. Official secularism has often assumed the denial of transcendent values, under cover of State neutrality. This position can be explained in view of the origins of the secular State as a reaction against the hegemonic social influence of Christian Churches prior to the French Revolution. The opposition between the religious and political spheres, however, has lost all meaning in today's world, at least in the West. In fact, as this article intends to show, the cultural changes arising precisely from the secularization of society require a new model of secular State, wherein the State should not seek to impose on its citizens a certain worldview which, although purportedly scientific, would in fact be ideological. On the contrary, it should promote the participation of all of civil society, and of the nation's religious communities in particular, in the public debate about issues of common interest, especially regarding their ethical aspects. Key Words : Secularity; State; Religion; Cultural traditions; Secularization; Ethics. (shrink)

According to a recent challenge to Kratzer's canonical contextualist semantics for deontic modal expressions, no contextualist view can make sense of cases in which such a modal must be information-sensitive in some way. Here I show how Kratzer's semantics is compatible with readings of the targeted sentences that fit with the data. I then outline a general account of how contexts select parameter values for modal expressions and show, in terms of that account, how the needed, contextualist-friendly readings might plausibly (...) get selected in the challenge cases. (shrink)

On Kratzer’s canonical account, modal expressions (like “might” and “must”) are represented semantically as quantifiers over possibilities. Such expressions are themselves neutral; they make a single contribution to determining the propositions expressed across a wide range of uses. What modulates the modality of the proposition expressed—as bouletic, epistemic, deontic, etc.—is context.2 This ain’t the canon for nothing. Its power lies in its ability to figure in a simple and highly unified explanation of a fairly wide range of language use. Recently, (...) though, the canon’s neat story has come under attack. The challenge cases involve the epistemic use of a modal sentence for which no single resolution of the contextual parameter appears capable of accommodating all our intuitions.3 According to these revisionaries, such cases show that the canonical story needs to be amended in some way that makes multiple bodies of information relevant to the assessment of such statements. Here I show that how the right canonical, flexibly contextualist account of modals can accommodate the full range of challenge cases. The key will be to extend Kratzer’s formal semantic account with an account of how context selects values for a modal’s.. (shrink)

The development in 1996 of a new generation of antiretroviral drugs was a major pharmaceutical advancement in the struggle against the epidemics of HIV and AIDS. However, due to high costs, access to these new drugs was almost impossible for most people living with HIV or AIDS. This situatiowhas been even more dramatic for those living with HIV/AIDS in poorer countries. Many of the organizations that are fighting for the rights of those with HIV have since developed human rights advocacy (...) and legal strategies to try to achieve universal access to treatment. These organizations are also fighting for states’ compliance with human rights obligations under health-related treatises and conventions. This paper draws upon the experience gained in Latin America, focusing on the legal strategies that have been explored in Venezuela and the legal consequences for domestic law. (shrink)

The development in 1996 of a new generation of antiretroviral drugs was a major pharmaceutical advancement in the struggle against the epidemics of HIV and AIDS. However, due to high costs, access to these new drugs was almost impossible for most people living with HIV or AIDS. This situatiowhas been even more dramatic for those living with HIV/AIDS in poorer countries. Many of the organizations that are fighting for the rights of those with HIV have since developed human rights advocacy (...) and legal strategies to try to achieve universal access to treatment. These organizations are also fighting for states’ compliance with human rights obligations under health-related treatises and conventions. This paper draws upon the experience gained in Latin America, focusing on the legal strategies that have been explored in Venezuela and the legal consequences for domestic law. (shrink)

Over the last fifteen years, linguists and philosophers of language have reexamined the canonical, Kratzerian semantics for modal expressions, with special attention paid to their epistemic and deontic uses. This article is an overview of the literature on deontic modal expressions. Section 1 provides an overview of the canonical semantics, noting some of its main advantages. Section 2 introduces a set of desiderata that have achieved the status of fixed points in the debates about whether the canonical semantics is correct. (...) These include the observations that deontic modal sentences have both deliberative and evaluative readings and both information-sensitive and -insensitive readings. Adequate resolutions of certain puzzles in deontic logic and resolving the Frege-Geach problem for Expressivism have also achieved this status. The third section provides an opinionated overview of some of the main extant rivals to the canonical semantics, including Cariani, Kaufmann, and Kaufmann’s (2013) complex contextualism , Yalcin’s (2012) Expressivism, Willer’s (2014) dynamic semantics, and Starr’s (2016) dynamic Expressivism. Section 4 provides an assessment of each of the views discussed in terms of the desiderata introduced in section 2. Section 5 is an overview of remaining issues that require more attention in the literature. (shrink)

One strategy for blocking Chalmers's overall case against physicalism has been to deny his claim that showing that phenomenal properties are in some sense physical requires an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones. Here I avoid this well-trodden ground and argue instead that an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones does not require an analysis in the Jackson/Chalmers sense. This is to sever the dualist's link between conceptual analysis and a (...) priori entailment by showing that the lack of the former does not imply the absence of the latter. Moreover, given the role of the argument from conceptual analysis in Chalmers's overall case for dualism, undermining that argument effectively undermines that case as a whole in a way that, I'll argue, undermining the conceivability arguments as stand-alone arguments does not. (shrink)

2. The Contingency and A posteriority Constraint: A formulation of the thesis must make physicalism come out contingent and a posteriori. First, physicalism is a contingent truth, if it is a truth. This means that physicalism could have been false, i.e. there are counterfactual worlds in which physicalism is false, for example, counterfactual worlds in which there are miracle -performing angels.[9] Moreover, if physicalism is true, our knowledge of its truth is a posteriori. This is to say that there are (...) ways the world could turn out to be such that physicalism is false. For example, if there are miracle -performing angels, then physicalism is false. So there are worlds considered as actual in which physicalism is false.[10] For short, call this ‘the a posteriority constraint’.[11]. (shrink)

What considerations place genuine constraints on an adequate semantics for normative and evaluative expressions? Linguists recognize facts about ordinary uses of such expressions and competent speakers’ judgments about which uses are appropriate. The contemporary literature reflects the widespread assumption that linguists don’t rely upon an additional source of data—competent speakers’ judgments about possible disagreement with hypothetical speech communities. We have several good reasons to think that such judgments are not probative for semantic theorizing. Therefore, we should accord these judgments no (...) probative value for the development of a semantics for our moral terms. Such judgments can no longer be presumed to put pressure on theories according to which our moral expressions share a semantics with ordinary, descriptive terms. Many rivals to pure, Descriptivist theories count among their advantages the ability to accommodate these judgments. If these judgments have no probative value, such theories lose an important source of support. (shrink)

Frank Jackson has argued that only if we have a priori knowledge of the extension-fixers for many of our terms can we vindicate the methodological practice of relying on intuitions to decide between philosophical theories. While there has been much discussion of Jackson’s claim that we have such knowledge, there has been comparatively little discussion of this most powerful argument for that claim. Here I defend an alternative explanation of our intuitions about possible cases, one that does not rely on (...) a priori extension-fixers. This alternative explanation provides a vindication of our reliance on intuitions, while blocking Jackson’s abductive argument for a priori semantic knowledge. In brief, I argue that we should regard our armchair intuitions as providing an important, a priori source of evidence for hypotheses about the contents of our implicit referential policies with regard to our terms. But all such hypotheses have a potential falsifier that is only discoverable empirically. In other words, gold-standard evidence for such hypotheses is always empirical. (shrink)

Here we focus on two questions: What is the proper semantics for deontic modal expressions in English? And what is the connection between true deontic modal statements and normative reasons? Our contribution towards thinking about the first, which makes up the bulk of our paper, considers a representative sample of recent challenges to a Kratzer-style formal semantics for modal expressions, as well as the rival views—Fabrizio Cariani’s contrastivism, John MacFarlane’s relativism, and Mark Schroeder’s ambiguity theory—those challenges are thought to motivate. (...) These include the Professor Procrastinate challenge to Inheritance (the principle that ‘If ought p and p entails q, then ought q), as well as Parfit’s miners puzzle regarding information-sensitive deontic modals. Here we argue that a Kratzer-style view is able to meet all of the challenges we’ll consider. In addition, we’ll identify challenges for each of those rival views. Our overall conclusion is that a Kratzer-style semantics remains the one to beat. With this assumption in place, we then ask how we should understand the relationship between true deontic modal statements and normative reasons. Should, for example, we hold that the truth of such a statement entails the existence of a normative reason for some agent to comply? Here we argue that, in many cases, acceptance of Kratzer’s semantics for deontic modals leaves open for substantive normative theorizing the question of whether an agent has a normative reason to comply with what she ought to do. (shrink)

What would be sufficient to show of some apparently higher-level property that it is 'nothing over and above' some complex configuration of more basic properties? This paper defends a new method for justifying reductions by demonstrating its comparative advantages over two methods recently defended in the literature. Unlike its rivals, what I'll call "the semantic method" makes a reduction's truth epistemically transparent without relying on conceptual analyses.

Recent challenges to Kratzer’s canonical contextualist semantics for modal expressions are united by a shared methodological practice: Each requires the assessment of the truth or warrant of a sentence in a scenario. The default evidential status accorded these judgments is a constraining one: It is assumed that, to be plausible, a semantic hypothesis must vindicate the reported judgments. Fully assessing the extent to which these cases do generate data that puts pressure on the canonical semantics, then, requires an understanding of (...) this methodological practice. Here I argue that not all assessments are fit to play this evidential role. To play it, we need reason to think that speakers’ assessments can be reasonably expected to be reliable. Minimally, having such grounds requires that assessments are given against the background of non-defectively characterized points of evaluation. Assessing MacFarlane’s central challenge case to contextualism about deontic modals in light of this constraint shows that his judgments do not have the needed evidential significance. In addition, new experimental data shows that once the needed scenario is characterized non-defectively, none of the resulting range of cases provides data that cannot be accommodated by a Kratzer-style contextualism. (shrink)

This paper addresses two related questions. First, what is involved in giving a distinctively realist and naturalist construal of an area of discourse, that is, in so much as stating a distinctively realist and naturalist position about, for example, content or value? I defend a condition that guarantees the realism and naturalism of any position satisfying it, at least in the case of positions on content, but perhaps in other cases as well. Second, what sorts of considerations render a distinctively (...) realist and naturalist position more plausible than its irrealist and non-naturalist rivals? The answer here focuses again on theories of content and is wholly negative. I argue that the standard array of arguments offered in support of realist and naturalist theories in fact provide equal support for a host of irrealist and non-naturalist ones. Taken together, these considerations reveal an important gap in the recent philosophical literature on content. The challenge to proponents of putatively realist and naturalist theories is to insure that those theories so much as state distinctively realist and naturalist positions and then to identify arguments that support what is distinctively realist and naturalist about them. (shrink)

Our goal here is to help identify the contextualist’s most worthy competitor to relativism. Recently, some philosophers of language and linguists have argued that, while there are contextualist-friendly semantic theories of deontic modals that fit with the relativist’s challenge data, the best such theories are not Lewis-Kratzer-style semantic theories. If correct, this would be important: It would show that the theory that has for many years enjoyed the status of the default view of modals in English and other languages is (...) in need of revision. Here we defend the default view by showing how a Kratzer-style semantics is able to make available readings of the relevant utterances that fit with the pretheoretical judgments opponents purport it cannot fully capture. Having established this, we turn to considering the more theoretical grounds proponents have offered for preferring their rival contextualist views. Here the question is to what extent such grounds favor semantic over what Korta and Perry call “near-side pragmatic” explanations of our judgments. In particular, we argue that our favored readings figure in near-side pragmatic explanations of those judgments that possess the methodological and theoretical advantages of systematicity and unity at least as well as, if not to a greater extent than, those of opponents who argue for their revised semantic theories on the basis of these advantages. (shrink)

Stephen Finlay’s proposed methodology for defending the central theses of his impressive Confusion of Tongues is an underexplored aspect of this work.1 1 His official methodology is analytic : A reduction of normative to non-normative vocabulary. Here, I argue that taking this official line at face-value forces the reader to conclude that the reductions at the heart of that book cannot be correct. In contrast, a philosophical methodology that does not proceed via analyses would better support those reductions, then understood (...) as non-analytic. As we’ll see below, there are independent, empirical reasons to reject a philosophical methodology that proceeds via analyses. I conclude that there is a method for the study of ethical language that better serves Finlay’s primary philosophical aims. The lesson, though, is generalizable: Given the array of normative and meta-normative theories, we want a semantics for normative discourse to be capable of expressing, we should expect that the more plausible such views will not be defended via analyses. (shrink)

In Discourse Contextualism, Alex Silk defends a new contextualist account of expressions at the centre of recent debates over contextualism versus relativism, namely, gradable adjectives, taste predicates and epistemic and deontic modals ).1 1 The first part of the book, which lays out the view and shows how it explains the phenomena at issue in those debates, focuses on the case of epistemic modals. The second part of the book extends that account with Discourse Contextualist treatments of the remaining expressions. (...) Discourse Contextualism is truly impressive in its scope, fully engaging with the relevant literature in linguistics, philosophy of language and meta-ethics. It is clearly written, carefully argued and makes a very significant contribution to the literature on the debates over contextualism, relativism and expressivism. No short review could possibly do justice to Silk’s book in its entirety. Here, I focus on its most fleshed out case study, that of epistemic modals. But the whole book will be required reading for anyone engaged in any of these debates. (shrink)

This article explores the limits of introductory social justice education and the ways in which a social foundations course could expand and deepen the social justice lens of current and future educators. The authors, members of an introductory graduate-level Social Foundations course, discuss the limitations they realized in their previous social justice education courses, and the importance of courses that further student's understandings of the ever-evolving ways people enact and experience identity, power, and privilege. The authors identify three main pedagogical (...) and theoretical elements that advanced their social justice knowledge: examining theories for their potential to uncover or obscure lived experience; unpacking binary constructions of identity; and exploring the limits and possibilities of intersectional thinking. This article offers implications and suggestions for educators who seek to challenge and expand the social justice knowledge of future educators and administrators. (shrink)

The human immune system can directly lyse invading micro‐organisms and aberrant host cells by generating pores in the cell envelope, called membrane attack complexes (MACs). Recent studies using single‐particle cryoelectron microscopy have revealed that the MAC is an asymmetric, flexible pore and have provided a structural basis on how the MAC ruptures single lipid membranes. Despite these insights, it remains unclear how the MAC ruptures the composite cell envelope of Gram‐negative bacteria. Recent functional studies on Gram‐negative bacteria elucidate that local (...) assembly of MAC pores by surface‐bound C5 convertase enzymes is essential to stably insert these pores into the bacterial outer membrane (OM). These convertase‐generated MAC pores can subsequently efficiently damage the bacterial inner membrane (IM), which is essential for bacterial killing. This review summarizes these recent insights of MAC assembly and discusses how MAC pores kill Gram‐negative bacteria. Furthermore, this review elaborates on how MAC‐dependent OM damage could lead to IM destabilization, which is currently not well understood. A better understanding on how MAC pores kill bacteria could facilitate the future development of novel strategies to treat infections with Gram‐negative bacteria. (shrink)

The selection of wanted from unwanted messages requires discriminatory mechanisms of as great a complexity as those in normal perception, as is indicated by behavioral evidence. The results of neurophysiology experiments on selective attention are compatible with this supposition. This presents a difficulty for Filter theory. Another mechanism is proposed, which assumes the existence of a shifting reference standard, which takes up the level of the most important arriving signal. The way such importance is determined in the system is further (...) described. Neurophysiological evidence relative to this postulation is discussed. (shrink)

Journalism in a toxic public sphere. Polluted spheres, eroding democracies -- Journalism, populism, and the problem of democracy -- Extreme populism and journalism -- Detoxing the public sphere. Democratically engaged journalism -- Democratically engaged journalism -- Extremism: hate speech and media harm -- Extremism: patriotism, fake news and objectivity.

Using a dialogue form, Mac Iver portrays a series of discussions among an intelligent group of specialists. The topics discussed include the nature of life, creation, sex, sensitivity, as well as the responsibility of the modern scholar to confront fundamental problems that extend beyond his limited field of inquiry. Mac Iver does catch the spirit of an informal discussion among specialists, but one wishes that he might have included a philosopher to help order the discussion and to clear up conceptual (...) confusions.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Any theory of information needs to comply with what we call the implementation, formalization, and representation constraints. These constraints are justified by basic considerations concerning scientific modelling and methodology. In the first part of this paper, we argue that the implementation and formalization constraints cannot be satisfied because the relation between Shannon information and IIT must be clarified. In the second part of the paper, we focus on the representation constraint. We argue that IIT cannot succeed in satisfying this constraint (...) for semantic contents without offering models for concepts, conceptual roles, and context sensitivity. In the final part of the paper, further complications are raised with respect to the distinction between consciousness and attention, which apply more specifically to the representation constraint. We conclude with some recommendations as to how IIT may succeed in solving these problems, highlighting the advantages and enormous potential of IIT as a scientific theory. (shrink)

A timely call for a new ethic of journalism engagement for today's troubled media sphere, Objectively Engaged Journalism argues that media should be neither neutral nor partisan but engaged in protecting egalitarian democracy. It shows how journalists, professional or citizen, can be both objective in method and dedicated to improving a global public sphere toxic with disinformation, fake news, and extremism. Drawing from history, ethics, and current media issues, Stephen Ward rejects the ideals of neutrality and "just the facts" objectivity, (...) showing how they are based on invalid dualistic thinking with deep roots in Western culture. He presents a theory of pragmatic objectivity and applies it to journalism. Journalism's role in interpreting culture, he argues, needs a form of objectivity that embraces human strengths and limitations. Defining responsible journalism as situated, imperfect inquiry, Objectively Engaged Journalism is one of the first systematic studies of the ethical foundations of engaged journalism for a media that is increasingly perspectival and embedded in society. (shrink)

Whenever some form of beneficent killing--for example, voluntary euthanasia--is advocated, the proposal is greeted with a flood of slippery-slope arguments warning of the dangers of a Nazi-style slide into genocide. This paper is an attempt systematically to evaluate arguments of this kind. Although there are slippery-slope arguments that are sound and convincing, typical formulations of the Nazi-invoking argument are found to be seriously deficient both in logical rigour and in the social history and psychology required as a scholarly underpinning. As (...) an antidote, an attempt is made both to identify some of the likely causes of genocide and to isolate some of the more modest but legitimate fears that lie behind slippery-slope arguments of this kind. (shrink)